Request

In August 2025, we made access to information and freedom of information requests to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), and Vancouver Police Department (VPD). We requested information on their policies and procedures for the search and seizure of electronic devices.

You’ll find the information we received from the VPD under the heading “Response”. We will provide summaries and analysis under the heading “Details & Analysis”.

Response

Overview

The VPD provided a staged response:

• October 3, 2025: Two pages from its Regulation and Procedures Manual (RPM).
• November 19, 2025: A list of vendors that provide tools used by its Digital Forensic Unit and a table showing how many searches were conducted per year.

We still hope to receive technical documentation, manuals, training materials, promotional materials, contracts, and purchase orders under 2(b) of the initial request.

October 3, 2025

The VPD provided two documents from its Regulation and Procedures Manual (RPM):

• RPM 1.7.6(i) Seizure of Recording Equipment and/or Images at Crime Scene
• RPM 1.9.19 Seizing Digital Media, Cryptocurrency, and Electronic Devices

November 19, 2025

The VPD provided a letter responding to specific questions about tools used to analyze seized devices, the number of seizures of electronic devices, and the authorities used to justify those seizures:

1216A Reply

Details & Analysis

Regulation and Procedures Manual (RPM) Documents

The VPD RPM documents cover two types of seizures: 1) seizure of recording equipment and images at crime scenes, and 2) seizure of digital media, cryptocurrency, and electronic devices.

Seizure of Recording Equipment or Images at Crime Scenes

Document: RPM 1.7.6(i) Seizure of Recording Equipment and/or Images at Crime Scene

Details

Section 1.7.6(i) of the VPD RPM covers police handling of recording equipment (defined as “a device capable of capturing still images, video images, or audio recordings”) belonging to media or members of the public, and the content of those devices.

The document reminds VPD members that the public has “the right to observe, photograph, and audio or video record in a public place, as long as they remain outside of police perimeters” and that the Charter right to freedom of the press means that “seizure of equipment, images or audio recordings from meda personnel will require a very high level of justification.”

If a member of the public identifies themselves as media, police “shall not seize their recording equipment unless there is an imminent public safety issue involved, or there are reasonable grounds to believe the evidence will be made unavailable to police (e.g., hidden or destroyed)”.

The RPM states that the Criminal Code allows police to seize recording devices if there are “exigent circumstances”, including concerns that the evidence on the devices will be destroyed or that they will not be able to serve a search warrant on the owner of the device. Such seizures must be documented, along with the specific exigent circumstances that gave rise to the seizure.

Finally, if a device is seized and then returned to the owner on the scene of the incident, documenting the seizure is still required under RPM 1.9.3 (Evidence and Property Management).

Analysis

We appreciate the clear statement of rights of the public and of the press, but there are some gaps in this RPM:

• The public’s right to record in public places includes recording the police in public places.
• The definition of “police perimeter” should be made clear, and should not extend so far as to make the right to record meaningless.
• “Exigent circumstances” are incredibly broad. There should be more guidance given on when it is appropriate to seize a device on the basis that evidence could be destroyed or be unavailable.
• The “exigent circumstances” standard should be even higher when the device contains recordings of potential police misconduct.

Seizure of Digital Media, Cryptocurrency, and Electronic Devices

Document: RPM 1.9.19 Seizing Digital Media, Cryptocurrency, and Electronic Devices

Details

Section 1.9.19 of the VPD RPM covers seizures of “digital and electronic devices”, digital media, and cryptocurrency. “Digital and electronic devices” has a broad definition, which includes but is not limited to:

computers, hard drives, tablets, cellular devices, other mobile devices, drones, vehicles, smart watches, and electronic storage media including CD/DVDs, USB thumb drives, memory cards and digital cameras.

The VPD Digital Forensics Unit (DFU) conducts forensic analysis of seized electronic devices, supports technical investigations, and prepares findings for court. Members are to consult the DFU before accessing electronic devices, and provides a generic procedure for when consultation is not immediately possible.

The VPD Forensic Video Unit is responsible for analysis of video and other media.

Members are reminded that just because a device can be lawfully seized does not mean it can be lawfully searched. For example, a search warrant for a place may not allow a search of electronic devices found in that place.

Process:

1. Contact DFU Sergeant “for guidance on how to properly disconnect or seize the electronic device, to ensure digital data or evidence is not lost or compromised.”
2. If the device operates on a cellular network, the member is not to turn it on if it is off, turn it off if it is on, or try to use it.
3. If the device is on, members are advised to keep it powered, either with a battery pack from the DFU office or Operations Command Centre, or permanent power.
4. The device is to be kept isolated from radio frequencies, either in a radio frequency proof container or in the DFU Faraday Room.
5. Store the device and its battery pack inside a radio frequency proof container as soon as possible (presumably to prevent remote access or wiping) and seal the lid.
6. Complete paperwork, including property tag, documentation of consent received for a search (if any), warrant for search, notes on what is required from the search, and an entry in the exhibit log book.
7. For urgent device searches, a DFU supervisor can call a DFU investigator after hours.

Analysis

We are concerned that treating cryptocurrency hardware wallets as if they were standard electronic devices or storage media could deny suspects or witnesses access to the funds in the wallet, thereby result in extrajudicial asset forfeiture or asset freezing. We will request additional information on the handling of cryptocurrency and associated hardware.

Forensic Tools & Seizure Statistics

Document: 1216A Reply

Details

Forensic Tools

The VPD provided a list of vendors that provide tools used by its Digital Forensics Unit (DFU):

• Cellebrite
• Magnet Forensics
• MSAB (Micro Systemation AB)
• SCG Canada
• Digital Intelligence
• Arsenal Recon
• XWays
• Final Data
• Passware
• Deepspar
• OpenText

VPD’s FOI team advised that searching for records for all 11 providers across 5 years would result in an enormous fee, so we agreed to narrow the scope of the request for such records to 4 years (2021-2025) and 6 of the 11 providers: Cellebrite, Magnet Forensics, MSAB, SGC Canada, Arsenal Recon, and Passware. Of the 11, these present the greatest concern with respect to Canadians’ Charter rights, and knowing more about how VPD uses these tools would be illuminating.

Seizure Statistics

VPD broke out its searches into three categories of search authorities:

• Judicial authorization (90%+)
• Consent (9%+)
• Coroner’s Act (1%)

VPD also provided a table breaking down the number of searches conducted by DFU each year. It noted the figures provided represent the number of times a tool was used, not the number of devices. For example, a server with 3 SSDs would count as 1 entry in evidence, but would count as 3 searches in this table.

Analysis

Forensic Tools

We are still waiting for the VPD to deliver records relating to the providers of forensic tools used by the DFU. While we wait, we used publicly available information to determine what tools from each of those providers the VPD is likely using, and what they are likely used for.

Note that while the providers have been confirmed to be used by VPD, the Likely Tools and Likely Use columns are just our best guesses, based on public information and what we do know about VPD practices. We hope to have more information on Cellebrite, Magnet Forensics, MSAB, SGC Canada, Arsenal Recon, and Passware soon.